Case C-1028/26, Gradijk – the Migration Pact and a narrower appeal against transfer
The Migration Pact replaced the Dublin system on 1 July 2026. Within three months, a Dutch court had asked the Court of Justice whether one of its central procedural choices is valid.
Facts
EO and her minor children, in C‑1028/26 (Gradijk), and RO, EK and their minor child, in C‑1023/26 (Midsen), are challenging transfer decisions of the Netherlands Minister for Asylum and Migration before the Rechtbank Den Haag, sitting in Roermond. The decisions were taken under Regulation (EU) 2024/1351, which repealed the Dublin III Regulation and applies from 1 July 2026. Its Article 43(1) gives the person concerned “the right to an effective remedy, in the form of an appeal or a review, in fact and in law, against a transfer decision before a court or tribunal”, but provides that “the scope of such remedy shall be limited to an assessment of” three matters. These are whether the transfer would result in a real risk of inhuman or degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the Charter, whether there are later circumstances decisive for the correct application of the Regulation, and, for persons taken charge of, whether Articles 25 to 28 and 34 have been infringed, provisions that include the rules on unaccompanied minors, family members and dependent persons. In both cases the referring court asks whether that limit is valid. It also asks about the review of children’s best interests, the personal interview and the start of the transfer period. (Gradijk and Midsen are fictitious names given by the Court.)
Questions Referred (C‑1028/26)
1. Is Article 43(1) of Regulation 2024/1351, read in the light of Article 41(2)(a) and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, valid in so far as it provides that the scope of a legal remedy against a transfer decision is limited to the grounds specified in Article 43(1)(a), (b) and (c)?
2. Is Article 22 of Regulation 2024/1351, read in conjunction with Article 23(1) of Regulation 2024/1351 and with Article 24(2), Article 41(2)(a) and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, to be interpreted as meaning that the decision to dispense with a personal interview in a take back procedure must be based on an assessment of the individual circumstances of the applicant, where that applicant, or one of those applicants, is a child, and that such a decision must state reasons?
3. Is Article 23(1) of Regulation 2024/1351, read in conjunction with Article 24(2) and Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, to be interpreted as meaning that the judicial authority seised to review the lawfulness of a transfer decision is obliged, where necessary of its own motion, to ascertain what is in the child’s best interests and to take those interests into account as a primary consideration in carrying out that judicial review?
4. Is Article 46(1) of Regulation 2024/1351, read in conjunction with Article 43(3) of Regulation 2024/1351, to be interpreted as meaning that the transfer period commences only upon the final decision on the appeal or review of a transfer decision provided that suspensive effect has been granted pursuant to Article 43(3) by a judicial decision on the first request for suspension, or does it suffice for that purpose that suspensive effect has been applied for?
In C‑1023/26 the first question is the same, read with Article 23(1) of the Regulation and Articles 7, 24(2) and 47 of the Charter; the second and third questions correspond to questions 3 and 4 above.
Sources
OJ notice C/2026/5888 (EUR‑Lex) · OJ notice in C‑1023/26, C/2026/5887 (EUR‑Lex) · Case file on CURIA · Regulation (EU) 2024/1351 · Ghezelbash, C‑63/15 (ECLI:EU:C:2016:409)
Comment
The limit in Article 43(1) reverses, for most applicants, the position under Ghezelbash (C‑63/15). There the Court held that, under Dublin III, an asylum seeker was “entitled to plead, in an appeal against a decision to transfer him, the incorrect application of one of the criteria for determining responsibility”. The new Regulation removes that possibility for most applicants. Outside the provisions listed in point (c), a person can no longer argue that the wrong Member State was chosen. They may argue only a risk of inhuman treatment or new circumstances. The referring court asks whether a remedy so confined is still the “effective remedy” that Article 47 requires, read with the right to be heard in Article 41(2)(a).
The answer depends on what Article 47 protects. If it guarantees review of everything that affects the decision, the limit is hard to defend, because an applicant can be sent to a Member State the Regulation does not make responsible without any court checking. If it allows the legislature to decide which rules confer individual rights, the limit may survive. On that view, the criteria for allocating responsibility between States are organisational rules that the applicant cannot enforce, except where the Regulation itself says otherwise. Ghezelbash rested on the wording and recitals of Dublin III, not on the Charter alone, which gives the Union legislature room to argue that it was entitled to change the rule.
The questions on children may matter as much in practice. Article 23(1) of the new Regulation makes “the best interests of the child” “a primary consideration for Member States with respect to all procedures provided for in this Regulation”. If a court must examine those interests of its own motion, as the third question asks, then any family with children reaches past the three listed grounds to a fuller review. The Court will have to say whether Article 43(1) also limits what a court must consider under Article 24(2) of the Charter.